On A.I. Vvedensky’s logicism

Abstract

The article substantiates the thesis that the philosophical work of Aleksandr I. Vvedensky may and should be considered in the context of neo-Kantianism. The author argues that Vvedensky was not only the first Russian neo-Kantian thinker, but also one of the first (and in Russia the first) analytical philosophers, since the logicism he developed contains essential elements of pragmatism, analytical philosophy and conceptual (therapeutic) analysis, as well as allows overcoming Kantian transcendentalism. It is noted that as a philosophical system, Vvedensky's logicism was developed by him as he tried to clarify and criticize the logic of the use of such metaphysical concepts as “thing-in-itself,” “phenomenon,” “experience,” “knowledge,” “faith,” “something given,” “law of nature,” “matter,” “meaning,” “meaning of life,” etc., as a result of which the structure of epistemic rationality was also clarified. It is shown in the article that Vvedensky believed that knowledge and metaphysics complement each other. He maintained that all knowledge is based on conscious, or morally grounded, faith, which is irrefutable, though unprovable. The paper argues that this notion is similar to Ludwig  Wittgenstein's notion of loop belief. In particular, the author shows that conscious belief in the existence of things-in-themselves can be interpreted as the looping belief (proposition) “Objects exist.” Then the notion of the thing-in-itself as a limit operated by Vvedensky coincides with the notion of the object as a principle of identification. It is concluded that the Russian philosopher came close to understanding the structure of epistemic rationality as a rationality local and presupposing the existence of logical certainties, i.e. loop beliefs (propositions, commitments). As to Vvedensky's religious position, it is characterized in the article as quasi-fideism.