N.O. Lossky’s intuitionism and contextual realism. Ideal-realism vs. “ideal realism”

Abstract

This article formulates the position of contextual realism and interprets the philosophy of Nikolai Lossky from this perspective. It argues that the Russian thinker’s theory of intuitionism contains some elements of both realism and antirealism (idealism) and, like contextual realism, consistently rejects the false and closely interrelated (pre)assumptions of modern philosophy and their consequences. It is shown that Lossky conducts a conceptual analysis and critically examines existing metaphysical positions, including rationalism, empiricism, and (neo)Kantianism. He develops a realistic epistemology of intuitionism that recognizes the reality of primary sensory experience and the possibility of knowing things themselves, and integrates this with his ideal-realist metaphysics, which includes a moderate Platonism. The conclusion is made that an understanding of sensory reality, a Platonizing, or ideal, dimension, and an ontological, not just epistemological, ethical realism are what contemporary philosophy really lacks. Furthermore, interpreting Lossky’s teachings within the framework of contextual realism allows for the application of some of his ideas to the philosophy of modern physics, particularly the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The merit of the Russian philosopher is that he (like the supporters of contextual realism) rejects representationalism and the dichotomy of internal and external. The article also draws attention to the contradictions in Lossky’s philosophical system. Although he rejected accusations that he reifies the ideal, this is indeed the case: for Lossky, the ideal is primary, embedded in reality, a dimension of it, and ontologized. Consequently, realism, and with it, his ethical position, proves limited or even problematic.