Later Wittgenstein, contextual realism, and the problem of the ideal according to E.V. Ilyenkov

Abstract

The relevance of the philosophical heritage of the Soviet philosopher E.V. Ilyenkov is shown. It is argued that the concept of the ideal, developed by Ilyenkov from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, can be considered now from the point of view of contextual realism, one of the sources of which is the philosophy of the late L. Wittgenstein. In the article contextual realism is characterized as formal (minimal) realism (reality is primary, simply such as it is; the concept of reality is the primary explanatory concept; reality is primary in the metaphysical sense as well) and as formal categorical dualism of the real and the ideal (concepts, rules, norms, theories, meaning are ideal, not part of reality; the ideal, however, if it is not pseudo-ideal, objectively exists, is rooted in the real, i.e. has real, or contextual, conditions for its existence and application). It is concluded that Ilyenkov’s position adequately fits into the framework of contextual realism, since the Soviet philosopher always fought against dogmatism, while genuine, non-dogmatic realism is impossible without contextualism. The author of the article interprets contextual realism as a philosophy on the basis of which Ilyenkov’s understanding of the ideal can be corrected, deepened and developed. Along with this, through contextual realism it is possible, the author believes, to save dialectical materialism from dogmatism and actualize this teaching, supplementing it with Wittgenstein’s “therapeutic” method. In this case, supporters of dialectical materialism will have to take into account that contextuality is a fundamental epistemological and ontological property of reality and that the main question of philosophy, or the problem of the ideal, is never solved, but “ bsolute iccally” removed.