A.I. Vvedensky’s psychological views on faith in God

Abstract

The article examines the epistemological and psychological foundations of the philosophy of Aleksandr I. Vvedensky (1856–1925) in the context of his treatise On the Limits and Signs of Animation (1892) and the essay The Fate of Faith in God in the Struggle with Atheism (1922). Special attention is paid to the philosopher’s key thesis that another person’s inner life has no objective signs and that its recognition is possible not on the basis of empirical observation, but as an act of moral feeling and volition. To explain this mechanism, Vvedensky introduces the notion of a “metaphysical sense” as a special “organ” that makes it possible to affirm the existence of both other subjectivities and God. The paper demonstrates that this approach anticipates contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences: on the problem of the “behavioral criterion of consciousness” (J. Searle, T. Nagel), on the theory of mind (D. Premack, G. Woodruff), as well as phenomenological studies of intersubjectivity (E. Husserl, M. Merleau-Ponty). Of particular importance is the classification of types of believers (intuitive, moral, and aesthetic) introduced by Vvedensky to prove the psychological stability of religion under conditions of atheistic propaganda. It is stressed that Vvedensky interprets faith as a state of complete confidence, excluding doubt, but not coinciding with knowledge. Moreover, he considers atheism as a form of faith as well. It is concluded that Vvedensky’s philosophy represents an important stage in the development of Russian thought being an original attempt to synthesize epistemology, psychology, and the philosophy of religion, which remains rather relevant for contemporary interdisciplinary studies of conscious¬ness and faith.